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Section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 gives judges’ only limited discretion when 
sentencing for stage-1 murder: the discretion to rebut the presumption of life 
imprisonment in circumstances where the sentence would otherwise be “manifestly 
unjust”. This is a high threshold, and the Court of Appeal has said that it will be met 
only in exceptional cases. The judgment in R v Cunnard is the first time that a person 
who derived their conviction of murder from a principal offender has had the 
presumption displaced, and this essay explores whether or not this decision has 
lowered the threshold to establish manifest injustice. Although Miller J’s judgment 
conforms to the common features that exist in the few cases where the presumption has 
been successfully displaced, it is not without criticism. There are issues as to whether 
an overall assessment of the circumstances of the offence and the offender were made, 
as well as significant concerns regarding the emphasis the judge placed on sentence 
parity between co-offenders.  
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I Introduction 
 
Trying a case is as easy as falling off a log. The difficulty comes in knowing what to do with the 
accused once they have been found guilty.
1
 
 
Sentencing is a critical, yet inherently complex, component of the criminal justice 
process. While clear statutory direction from the legislature underpins the trial and 
conviction of an offender, with guilt turning on whether evidentiary thresholds are met, 
the application of a sentence is inherently discretionary.  
 
This essay will analyse some of the inherent difficulties in sentencing for murder 
through an extended case study of R v Cunnard.
23
 Cunnard was convicted of murder as 
a party, but received a sentence of only 10 years imprisonment with no minimum period 
of non-parole. The sentencing regime for murder encompasses several sections within 
the Sentencing Act 2002,
4
 but begins with s 102 where there is a legal presumption 
requiring a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment unless such a sentence 
would be manifestly unjust.
5
 The sentencing judge, Miller J, rebutted the presumption 
and held that it would be manifestly unjust for Cunnard to receive life imprisonment. 
 
Utilising the legislative history and previous case law pertaining to s 102, this essay will 
examine whether the decision in R v Cunnard conforms to the previously developed 
criteria as to what constitutes manifest injustice. Discussion will specifically centre on 
how the courts have approached the principles and purposes of sentencing found under 
ss 7 and 8, as well as the relevance and weight given to mitigating factors when there 
are no significant personal aggravating factors. The essay will also discuss the 
difficulties of achieving parity in sentencing when dealing with co-offenders and how 
this prejudiced Miller J’s analysis, as well as wider issues relating to judicial discretion 
when sentencing for murder. Such an examination will allow for a consideration as to 
whether the decision in R v Cunnard was justified and what ramifications, if any, it has 
for future s 102 cases. 
                                                            
1
 Geoff Hall Sentencing: 2007 Reforms in Context (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) quoting McArdle J, at 1. 
2
 R v Cunnard [2012] NZHC  815.  
3
 This case is also referred to in judgments as R v McNaughton, after the principal offender.  
4
 All statutory references henceforth will be to the Sentencing Act 2002, except if otherwise stated.  
5
 The sentencing regime is different if the murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence under s 86E of the Sentencing 
Act 2002.  This essay focusses exclusively on s 102, which is triggered if the murder is a stage-1 offence.  
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II R v Cunnard: Facts and Procedural History 
On 14 November 2009, Troy Minto was shot and killed at Branford Park on the 
outskirts of Nelson. Blair McNaughton fired the weapon and was charged and convicted 
of murder by a jury in the Nelson High Court. Blake Cunnard supplied the firearm and 
was convicted of murder as a party under s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961.
6
 
 
The underlying tension which sparked the confrontation that ultimately led to Minto’s 
death lay between two people: Mr Warren and Mr Proctor. Cunnard’s involvement 
began subsequent to an initial confrontation which had occurred between the Warren 
and Proctor groups at the Motueka drag races. Although this preliminary confrontation 
was not physical in nature it acted as a catalyst for the two parties to arrange a fight, 
where Warren and Procter were to engage in a one-on-one brawl.  
 
The fight was organised to be a fist fight only; this is what both sides saw as the “rules 
of the street”.
7
 However, given the inherent distrust between the two groups, both sides 
opted to bring weapons. These included baseball bats, knuckle dusters and a jemmy bar; 
Cunnard was the only person to bring a firearm. He was collected by Warren and 
McNaughton shortly before the fight, where he brought along a golf bag containing a 
shotgun and a .22 rifle. Cunnard loaded the weapon in anticipation of the altercation. 
 
Whilst waiting for the Proctor group to arrive, the Warren group discussed strategy. 
Miller J was satisfied that this planning extended to the use of the gun, and added that it 
would be “inconceivable that so lethal, so exceptional a weapon would be loaded and 
taken with no discussion about how it might be put to work”.
8
 He accepted, however, 
that the gun was not brought along with any express intention to shoot anyone, and 
would instead be used only to intimidate the Proctor group should things go wrong.  
 
During the altercation itself Cunnard did not immediately participate in the fighting. 
McNaughton and Cunnard only stepped forward when they saw one of their associates 
fall to the ground after taking a heavy blow to the head with a baseball bat. The 
aggressor with the bat told them to stay back, and it was at this point that Cunnard 
                                                            
6
 See appendix. 
7
 At [11]. 
8
 At [15]. 
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removed the firearm from the vehicle and pointed it at the Proctor group. Miller J 
accepted that this was done to warn them off.  
 
After a brief period of continued fighting, McNaughton took the gun from Cunnard. 
There was a transitory stand-off between McNaughton and Minto, and the latter then 
charged forward. He was shot from a distance of three metres. The wound was fatal. 
 
III The Role of Section 102 in Sentencing for Murder 
 
A Legislative and Statutory Foundations 
Section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 creates a presumption in favour of life 
imprisonment for murder, and is to be read in conjunction with s 172 of the Crimes Act 
1961.
9
 The section reads: 
 
102 Presumption in favour of life imprisonment for murder 
(1) An offender who is convicted of murder must be sentenced to imprisonment for life unless, 
given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a sentence of imprisonment for life 
would be manifestly unjust. 
(2) If a court does not impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on an offender convicted of 
murder, it must give written reasons for not doing so. 
(3) This section is subject to section 86E(2). 
 
If the murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence then s 86E is triggered, and the judge’s 
discretion as to whether or not to apply a life sentence is removed. The presumption 
under s 86E(2)(b) is that the sentence will be served without parole.  
 
According to the Law and Order Select Committee, the manifestly unjust provision was 
only intended to target a very small group of people. Examples given by the Committee 
of when the presumption of life imprisonment might be displaced included cases of 
mercy killings, failed suicide pacts and in situations where the offender is considered a 
‘battered defendant’. These same examples were later given by the Ministry of Justice 
in a report which canvassed how judicial sentencing practises had changed after the 
                                                            
9
 See appendix. 
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introduction of the Sentencing Act.
10
  During the first reading of the Bill, the Minister of 
Justice said that the inclusion of a rebuttable presumption in s 102 would reduce the 
likelihood that a jury, in order to compensate for a lack of flexibility at sentencing,
11
 
would return a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder.  
 
Once the court considers it manifestly unjust to impose a life sentence and accordingly 
rebuts the presumption, the full range of sentencing options under the Sentencing Act 
become available.
12
 The court will therefore have recourse to any sentence it thinks 
appropriate to fulfil the principles and purposes of sentencing.
 1314
 It also triggers the 
consideration of s 16 of the Sentencing Act,
15
 which requires the sentencing judge to 
have regard to the desirability of keeping offenders in the community as opposed to in 
prison, “as far as that is practical and consonant with the safety of the community”.
16
 
 
B Common Features of Successful 102 Rebuttals 
The Sentencing Act does not define the expression ‘manifestly unjust’. This is 
consistent with the legislative intent: to give judge’s more discretion and flexibility 
when dealing with an offender,
17
 allowing them to impose a sentence which better 
reflects the variety of factors that can arise in an individual case, and in turn dispensing 
with “rigid and arbitrary distinctions”.
18
  It is therefore necessary to turn to the common 
law and examine how the judges have approached, interpreted, and applied the 
provision. An analysis of the common features present in cases where the s 102 
presumption has been successfully rebutted gives an insight into what issues and 
principles judges give weight to when deciding what constitutes manifest injustice. 
These common features can then be compared with the facts of Cunnard, providing a 
yard stick against which Miller J’s judgment can be measured. 
 
                                                            
10
 Rajesh Chhana and others ‘The Sentencing Act 2002: Monitoring the First Year’ (Ministry of Justice, March 
2004). 
11
 The Criminal Justice Act 1985 made life imprisonment for murder mandatory. The sentencing judge had no 
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. 
12
 R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 at [52]. 
13
 See appendix for the hierarchy of sentences and orders available under section 10A of the Sentencing Act 
2002. 
14
 See appendix for the full list of the principles and purposes of sentencing. 
15
 Which previously would have been irrelevant due to the application of section 16(3)(a), see appendix.  
16
 Sentencing Act 2002, s 16(1). 
17
 (14 August 2001) 594 NZPD 10910. 
18
 Chhana ‘The Sentencing Act 2002: Monitoring the First Year’, above n 10 at [54].  
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1 Strong Mitigating Factors and No Significant Personal Aggravating Factors 
Section 102 requires the court to assess the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender, which in turn requires an analysis of the applicable aggravating and mitigating 
factors set out under ss 9(1) and 9(2) respectively. All of the cases in which the 
presumption of life imprisonment has been successfully rebutted have been 
characterised by the presence of strong mitigating factors, and no significant personal 
aggravating factors.  
 
The defendants in R v Wihongi and R v Rihia both suffered from a long history of abuse 
at the hands of their victims, and both suffered from significant cognitive impairment.
19
 
When sentencing Rihia, Toogood J commented that “the violence of your relationship is 
demonstrated by the 36 incidents between [the victim] and you attended by Police over 
the period of 11 years,”
20
 which resulted in what the clinical psychologist described as a 
complex post-traumatic stress disorder.
21
 Wihongi was characterised as a ‘battered 
defendant’, having been abused and raped by her de facto partner and members of his 
gang on numerous occasions. Note that offending involving a battered defendant was 
one of the situations in which the Law and Order Select Committee thought it was 
appropriate for the s 102 presumption to be displaced.  
 
The Select Committee mentioned also mentioned cases of mercy killings, which was the 
primary mitigating factor in R v Law. This was a case where the accused was convicted 
of murdering his wife who had been suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, in pursuance 
of a previous pact they had made whereby they promised to “do each other in”
22
 should 
either of them fall victim to the illness. In this sense the defendant was acting out of 
compassion, not malice,
23
 with the sentencing judge accepting that he had “acted with 
the best of motives in the situation as [he] saw it”.
24
 While there did exist serious 
aggravating factors in this case, namely the premeditation and vulnerability of the 
victim, Randerson J felt that these were far outweighed by the mitigating factors, which 
                                                            
19
 R v Wihongi [2012] 1 NZLR 755; R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720. 
20
 At [16]. 
21
 At [20]. 
22
 At [4]. 
23
 At [47]. 
24
 At [44]. 
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also included the offenders guilty plea, previous good character and remorse.
25
 In any 
event, these are aggravating factors relating to the offence, not the offender. 
 
Premeditation was also an aggravating factor in R v Nelson,
26
 a case concerning a 13 
year old boy who shot the partner of his caregiver in the back of the head. But again the 
Court displaced the presumption of life imprisonment partly on the basis of a number of 
mitigating factors: a deficiency in decision-making abilities and an inability to process 
information,
27
 a turbulent family situation, the dynamics of which contributed to the 
killing,
28
 and youth.
29
 The latter was of particular importance, with Heath J stating that 
he “does not see that society’s interests are enhanced in any way by sentencing a 13 
year old boy to life imprisonment”.
30
 
 
There were no personal aggravating factors relating to Cunnard,
31
 in contrast to a 
myriad of mitigating factors: the absence of any “material criminal history”,
32
 indicative 
of his previous good character; his acceptance of responsibility and extensive remorse; a 
willingness to co-operate with Police; and the difficult family circumstances of his 
childhood, which were a catalyst for a drug and alcohol dependency. Miller J also gave 
particular weight to Cunnard’s involvement in a restorative justice conference with the 
victim’s family, noting that he was the only offender to have done so.
33
 Participation in 
such a conference has also been conferred particular importance by the legislature with 
its inclusion as a principle of sentencing under s 8(j), any positive result of which must 
be taken into account by the judge.  
 
Although the mitigating factors relating to Cunnard are not uniquely compelling, nor 
can they be characterised as falling under one of the situations mentioned by the Law 
and Order Select Committee, they were nevertheless sufficient to assist in displacing the 
presumption. Indeed, Miller J specifically cited the mitigating factors as being one of 
                                                            
25
 At [53]. 
26
 R v Nelson [2012] NZHC 3570. 
27
 At [37]. 
28
 At [8] – [9] and [44]. 
29
 At [38] 
30
 At [50]. 
31
 R v Cunnard, above n 2, at [67]. 
32
 At [68]. 
33
 At [57].  
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the reasons life imprisonment would be disproportionately severe.
34
 This was seen to be 
appropriate, given the peripheral involvement and limited culpability of Cunnard in the 
first place. On this ground Miller J’s judgment is consistent with previous authority.     
 
2 Accepted Responsibility and Demonstrated Remorse 
A key feature that runs through most of the cases which displace the presumption of life 
imprisonment is the offender’s acceptance of responsibility for the offending and a 
demonstration of significant remorse,
35
 the former of which is codified under s 7(1)(b) 
as a purpose of sentencing. A guilty plea is one way this can be conveyed.
36
 The Court 
in R v Rihia noted that:
37
 
 
You recognise your responsibility for what happened, and pleading guilty to murder – knowing 
that you faced the prospect of life imprisonment – was in many respects courageous, and a 
significant step on the path to rehabilitation. 
  
A guilty plea was also present in R v Law, but in that case the judge also noted the 
defendant’s serious attempt at taking his own life.
38
 This was a demonstration of the 
offender’s substantial remorse, supported by the judge’s comment that “the loss of your 
wife is a greater penalty for you than anything I can impose”.
39
 An attempt at suicide 
after the commission of the offence was likewise a feature of R v Reid,
40
 with Brewer J 
noting that the defendant had been horrified by his actions.
41
 R v Reid is also unique in 
that the offender confessed to the crime, a confession without which the crime would 
not have been discovered. 
 
Cunnard’s acceptance of responsibility as well as his demonstrated remorse is consistent 
with these other cases in which life imprisonment has been held to be manifestly unjust. 
Following his arrest on the night of the offending he provided a full and frank statement 
to the Police regarding what happened and his role in the events. Although he did not 
                                                            
34
 At [69]. 
35
 R v Nelson is the only exception, but this could be due to the notable youth of the defendant.  
36
 The presence of a guilty plea also has  wider significance at sentencing for policy reasons, and can warrant a 
discount in sentence of up to 25 per cent, see Hessell v R [2011] 1 NZLR 607. 
37
 At [30]. 
38
 At [10]. 
39
 At [44]. 
40
 R v Reid HC Auckland CRI-2008-090-2203, 4 February 2011. 
41
 At [8]. 
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plead guilty to murder, he did plead guilty to manslaughter, which is understandable 
given his peripheral involvement in the offence. Cunnard also participated in a 
restorative justice conference with the victim’s mother and brother prior to sentencing, 
with Miller J noting that he was the only offender to have done so, and with the family 
indicating that he was the only one to treat them with respect throughout the criminal 
justice process.
42
 This, according to the judge, highlighted the depth of Cunnard’s 
genuine remorse for what happened.
43
 
 
3 The Need to Protect the Community as an Overriding Purpose 
Protecting the public from an offender is often considered an overriding purpose of the 
courts,
44
 despite its equal statutory status next to the other purposes of sentencing listed 
under s 7.
45
 Professor Geoff Hall has suggested that “the goal of sentencing is the 
protection of society and the purposes of sentencing listed in s 7 are the means by which 
this is achieved,”
46
 which is consistent with comments made by the judiciary. For 
example, the English Court of Appeal in R v Howells held that “courts should always 
bear in mind that criminal sentences are in almost every case intended to protect the 
public”.
47
  
 
This emphasis placed on protection is also seen in the New Zealand case law concerning 
s 102. The High Court in R v Mikaele grappled with the perceived conflict between a 
defendant’s culpability – which had been reduced due to an early guilty plea, remorse 
and diminished intellectual capacity – and the need for public safety.
48
 Harrison J 
concluded that “as much as [he] would like to extend the hand of mercy to the 
[defendant],”
49
 it would not be manifestly unjust to impose life imprisonment on the 
basis that “without formal and intensive supervision, there is a strong risk that [the 
defendant] would commit the same or a similar crime within a short period”.
50
 This 
indicates that the need to protect the community from an offender is the overriding 
consideration when assessing whether to rebut the presumption in s 102, seemingly 
                                                            
42
 At [33]. 
43
 At [57]. 
44
 Sir Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [SA7.06]. 
45
 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(g).  
46
 Geoff Hall, Sentencing Law and Practice (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [SA7.1]. 
47
 R v Howells [1999] 1 Cr App R 98 at [104]. 
48
 R v Mikaele HC Auckland T013638, 30 August 2002. 
49
 At [71]. 
50
 At [71]. 
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confirmed at para [80] where Harrison J noted that “ultimately, when weighing all the 
principles and factors in balance, I am satisfied that the need to protect the public must 
prevail”. 
 
Similar overriding emphasis was given to s 7(1)(g) by Brewer J in R v Reid.
51
 Mr Reid 
was found guilty of murdering his 84-year-old neighbour. At the time she was killed 
Reid was suffering from major depression and psychotic delusions, believing that the 
victim was spying on him. Brewer J held that Reid would not have committed the 
murder but for this illness, and that he had since been receiving treatment which had 
improved his mental condition significantly. He therefore found that Reid no longer 
posed a risk to himself or others, which was one of the primary reasons why he held that 
a life sentence would be manifestly unjust under s 102, sentencing Reid instead to 10 
years imprisonment.  
 
The weight these two cases place on protecting the community from the offender is such 
that s 7(1)(g) almost becomes a preliminary test when considering whether a life 
sentence is manifestly unjust. Only if the court considers that public safety is not at risk 
will it move on to consider more broadly the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender in an overall assessment. However the converse is not true: if there is no risk to 
the community, this by itself is not enough to rebut the s 102 presumption. Randerson J 
in R v Law said that although the defendant posed no danger to the community, “that is 
not the only matter to be considered”.
52
 In other words, the s 102 presumption will 
never be rebutted if there is a risk to public safety, but if there is no risk then the 
presumption still stands and an analysis of the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender is necessary.  
 
This approach is consistent with the approach undertaken by Miller J when sentencing 
Cunnard. The judge noted that Cunnard’s probation officer had assessed him as being at 
a low risk of reoffending,
53
 and backed this up implicitly by referring to his remorse
54
 
and his peripheral role in the altercation.
55
 While it was mentioned that Cunnard 
                                                            
51
 R v Reid, above n 40. 
52
 R v Law, above n 12, at [62]. 
53
 At [56]. 
54
 At [57] and [68]. 
55
 At [65]. 
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suffered from a traumatic brain injury in his youth which resulted in behavioural 
changes and eventually an abuse of drugs and alcohol,
56
 Miller J gave this little weight, 
because unlike in Reid and Mikaele, these were peripheral problems that were not 
material contributing factors to the commission of the offence. Once it was decided that 
the protection of the community was not at issue, discussion turned to the other 
applicable purposes and principles of sentencing in order to decide whether to rebut the 
s 102 presumption, which is again consistent with the approach taken in Law. 
 
4 The Imposition of a Life Sentence is Not Necessary for General Deterrence 
Deterrence is a “well-entrenched principle which has been widely recognised and relied 
upon in sentencing practise,”
57
 having been codified as a purpose of sentencing under s 
7(f). However the importance of deterrence in murder cases where the s 102 
presumption is at issue has been held to be limited. In R v Wihongi the Court said:
58
 
 
We do not see the sentencing principle of deterrence of others as having a major impact on 
decisions under s 102. By definition, cases involving the consideration of the appropriateness of 
life imprisonment are exceptional cases where there are significant factors (usually personal to the 
offender) mitigating the culpability of the offender, calling into play other sentencing principles, 
particularly rehabilitation.  
 
This indicates that although general deterrence is not irrelevant, it is subordinate to other 
more relevant principles when grappling with s 102. This is consistent with the 
approach taken in R v Law, where the Court acknowledged that it would be “sending the 
wrong message to the community if it were prepared to allow the deliberate killing of 
someone suffering from such a disease or other affliction to go unpenalised.”
59
 
Nevertheless the Court held that general deterrence could be achieved without recourse 
to a sentence of life imprisonment.  
 
On this basis Miller J’s imposition of a sentence less than life is consistent with other 
cases which have held general deterrence to be of limited importance. Despite stating 
                                                            
56
 At [56]. 
57
 Robertson, above n 44, at [SA7.05]. 
58
 At [93]. 
59
 At [62]. 
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that general deterrence requires a stern sentence to be imposed,
60
 he nonetheless 
acknowledged that Cunnard was not the principal offender and his involvement in the 
offence was peripheral. For the quantum of his sentence to reflect the need deter murder 
generally would be disproportionate to his participation and culpability: a more 
appropriate purpose of denunciation in Cunnard’s case would be to (1) prevent people 
from engaging in group violence, and (2) prevent people from brandishing loaded 
firearms.  Although these alternative general deterrence purposes were not made explicit 
by Miller J, his imposition of a sentence less than life suggests that deterring people 
from murder generally was not a primary consideration, and that it was given only little 
attention in the overall analysis.  
 
C Overarching Need for an Overall Assessment 
Although Cunnard is consistent with various individual features of previous successful 
s 102 cases, the Court of Appeal in R v Rapira has said that manifest injustice “is a 
conclusion likely to be reached in exceptional cases only,”
61
 and that the analysis must 
be undertaken in light of the principles and purposes of sentencing set out in ss 7, 8 and 
9 of the Sentencing Act. Furthermore, s 102 itself explicitly states that the court must 
take into account the circumstances of both the offence and the offender, articulated by 
Elias CJ as requiring an “overall assessment.”
62
 Priestly J in R v O’Brien conveyed 
similar sentiments, stating that:
63
 
 
‘Unjust’ can only mean that in the context of a particular murder and particular offender, the 
normal sentence of life imprisonment runs counter to both a Judge’s perception of a lawfully just 
result and also offends against the community’s innate sense of justice. 
 
The High Court in R v Rawiri explicitly put forward a number of principles that affect 
the exercise of discretion under s 102,
64
 which included the need for the test to be 
satisfied in light of both the offender and the offence, consistent with the wording of s 
102(1). Fisher J said that although there might be strong mitigating factors which go 
towards rebutting the presumption, the circumstances of the offence can preclude 
                                                            
60
 At [70]. 
61
 R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA) at [121]. 
62
R v Rapira, above n 61, at [121]. 
63
 R v O’Brien (2003) 20 CRNZ 572 at [19]. 
64
 R v Rawiri HC Auckland T 014047, 16 September 2002 at [27] – [30]. 
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departure. An analysis of both is necessary. This was further highlighted in R v Mikaele, 
where Harrison J noted the difference in wording of s 102 as compared to the Law 
Commission recommendation, commenting that:
65
 
 
“[t]here is one critical and, I assume, deliberate difference. Parliament substituted the conjunctive 
‘and’ for the disjunctive ‘or’ in relation to the circumstances of the offence and the offender; they 
must be considered cumulatively, not the in the alternative”.  
 
This is consistent with the legislative intention of the sentencing reforms, which was to 
allow the “imposition of a sentence by the Court which was appropriate in all the 
circumstances.”
66
 
 
Complications can arise however where a judge does not ‘practise what they preach’. It 
is not uncommon for a judge to indicate that an overall analysis will be undertaken, but 
then focus their discussion and decision exclusively around only one of the 
aforementioned ‘common features’. An overall analysis – at least on the face of the 
sentencing notes – is not present.  
 
This was the situation in Cunnard. Although Miller J prefaced his sentence by saying, 
“looking at your case in the round, I have reached the firm view that life imprisonment 
would be manifestly unjust”
67
 and formulating his sentencing notes under the headings 
of ‘personal circumstances’ and ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’, the only principle 
of sentencing that he discussed fully and at any length was the need for parity, which 
itself is only tangentially related to s (8)(e). Little to no discussion was had around any 
of the other principles of sentencing listed under s 8.  
 
Miller J does however have statutory support for this approach. Section 31(2) says that 
“reasons may be given under this section with whatever level of particularity is 
appropriate to the particular case”. When looking at the case in the round, Miller J 
acknowledged the existence of all the relevant circumstances of the offence and the 
offender, but only discussed with particularity those which were of particular relevance 
to the unique facts of the case: that is, parity of sentencing. It would be redundant and 
                                                            
65
 R v Mikaele, above n 48, at [40]. 
66
 Geoff Hall Sentencing Law and Practice, above n 46, at 591. 
67
 At [69]. 
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inefficient to force a judge to raise and dismiss every principle and purpose of 
sentencing listed under ss 7 and 8, as well as every factor under s 9, if they are not 
relevant on the individual facts of the case. 
 
This is further corroborated by s 31(4), a statutory bar which operates to prevent a 
judge’s failure to discuss any principle of sentencing from turning into a ground for 
appeal.
68
 This however creates linguistic difficulties within the Act. The principles of 
sentencing listed under s 8 are all individually prefaced by the auxiliary verb ‘must’ (i.e. 
“must take into account”), and yet the operation of ss 31(2) and 31(4) gives judges a 
shield to hide behind if, as was the case in Cunnard, they choose not to discuss them in 
their judgment. This is contradictory, and it is therefore necessary to read into s 8 an 
implicit qualifier before each of the principles: that they must be taken into account only 
if they are relevant to the facts of the case. This would allow irrelevant principles to be 
ignored, and would mean that relevant yet marginal principles need only be 
acknowledged by the judge, and not discussed with any particularity as per s 31(2). In 
this way an overall assessment will be undertaken, satisfying the wording of s 102 and 
the previous common law direction, despite the bulk of the discussion centring on only 
one particular issue. In R v Cunnard the particular issue was parity of sentencing.  
 
IV Party liability and parity of sentencing 
Miller J noted explicitly at para [69] that one of the reasons life imprisonment for 
Cunnard would be manifestly unjust was due to the sentence imposed on the principal 
offender, McNaughton. He said that “a party’s culpability, or degree of involvement in 
the offence, may differ greatly from the principal,”
69
 and referred to ss 8(a) and 9(2)(d) 
as statutory authority for taking this into account when imposing a sentence.  
  
McNaughton was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 
10 years.
70
 His degree of culpability was significantly higher than Cunnard’s, with 
Miller J noting at para [44] that McNaughton was a leader, “instrumental in arranging 
the fight, planning [the] group’s strategy, and trying to manage the fight as it went on”. 
Furthermore, he was the only person to threaten the other side with the firearm; 
                                                            
68
 See appendix. 
69
 At [61]. 
70
 R v Cunnard, above n 2, at [53]. 
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Cunnard in comparison only wielded it in self-defence. When McNaughton did fire the 
weapon, Miller J described it as a “deliberate and grossly excessive reaction to the 
threat [Minto] posed,”
71
 and on these findings a sentence of life imprisonment was held 
not to be manifestly unjust. 
 
While it is clear that co-offenders can have different levels of culpability, and as such 
different sentences,
72
 this is the first time that the court has sentenced a principal 
offender to life imprisonment while displacing the presumption of life imprisonment for 
their co-offender on the grounds of manifest injustice. Given that both McNaughton and 
Cunnard were convicted of murder, such a disparity in sentence may cause issues 
around the concept of even-handed justice. The Court of Appeal in R v Lawson said 
that:
73
 
 
[A] marked difference in the sentence imposed on co-offenders, and for which no justification can be 
shown, may be of importance to the administration of justice generally in that such a marked and 
unjustified difference will tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Court must 
bear in mind that public confidence in the administration of justice is best preserved if justice appears 
to be administered even-handedly. 
 
Although there is no requirement in law that co-offenders be treated alike,
74
 Miller J 
acknowledged the importance of parity at sentencing and the need to treat the sentences 
imposed on offenders differently where their culpability and circumstances differ 
materially.
75
  
 
The issue then becomes whether McNaughton was so much more culpable than 
Cunnard that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment, whereas the latter should 
only receive 10 years. On the facts such a conclusion seems entirely open and 
reasonable. As stated above, Cunnard’s involvement in the offence extended to bringing 
the gun (albeit having no intention to use it) and pointing at the Proctor group in self-
defence. He had several opportunities to fire the weapon during the fight, but opted not 
to, at one stage opting to be assaulted rather than pull the trigger. The only reason he 
                                                            
71
 At [44]. 
72
 Police v Egden [1977] 1 NZLR 123 (CA); R v Phillips [1991] 3 NZLR 175 (CA). 
73
 R v Lawson [1982] 2 NZLR 219 at [223]. 
74
 Geoff Hall Sentencing Law and Practice, above n 46, at [2.2.14]. 
75
 At [64]. 
16 
 
was convicted of murder was because of the way s 66(2) of the Crimes Act applies: he 
joined in the common purpose knowing that the use of the weapon with murderous 
intent – not necessarily by him, but by any individual there (of whom he has no control 
over) - was a probable consequence. This, coupled with his personal circumstances and 
the aforementioned mitigating factors, gives rise to a significantly lower level of 
culpability than McNaughton. As such, the lower sentence imposed does not stand out 
as being “unjustifiable or gross,”
76
 especially given the legitimate range of discretion 
open to a sentencing judge.
77
 
 
However, the need for parity raises other complications. When sentencing Cunnard, 
Miller J seems to have manipulated the length of imprisonment in order to achieve a 
parity that represents the parties’ respective culpability. In other words, in deciding the 
quantum of Cunnard’s sentence the judge has given disproportionate weight in trying to 
achieve parity in relation to McNaughton’s sentence. It could be argued that in doing so 
he failed to make the required overall assessment of the circumstances of the offender 
and offence as stipulated in previous cases and s 102 itself.   
 
There are several aspects of Miller J’s judgment that lend credence to this theory. The 
first is that the minimum period of non-parole imposed can be used as a mechanism to 
reflect the level of culpability between co-offenders. If two co-offenders are both 
sentenced under s 102, and the presumption of life imprisonment is not rebutted – which 
is the situation in the majority of murder cases given the very high threshold of manifest 
injustice – then the more culpable party will receive a longer non-parole period. This is 
necessary to satisfy s 86(2).
78
  However, Miller J was unable to reflect Cunnard and 
McNaughton’s respective culpabilities in the imposition of a non-parole period, as s 
103(2) establishes that the non-parole period may not be less than 10 years. Given that 
he had sentenced McNaughton to a minimum non-parole period of 10 years, the only 
avenue left for him to distinguish the pairs’ determinate sentence, and in turn level of 
culpability, was by rebutting the presumption under s 102 in relation to Cunnard.  It is 
therefore plausible that a major reason Cunnard did not receive life imprisonment is 
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because his sentence would have to have been identical to that of McNaughton, and this 
would not accurately reflect McNaughton’s higher culpability.  
 
What this means is that Miller J gave disproportionate weight to s 8(e) when sentencing: 
that is, the need for consistency in sentences between similar offenders committing 
similar offences in similar circumstances. At para [69] he explicitly says that although 
he has looked at the case in the round, the “dominant consideration” he gave weight to 
when rebutting the presumption of life imprisonment was parity of treatment. This is 
going about the analysis in the wrong order. It should never be necessary to give 
disproportionate attention to parity when deciding on an appropriate sentence, as the 
sentence reached after making an overall assessment of each individual offender’s 
circumstances and involvement should inherently reflect the different levels of 
culpability. Section 8(e) should therefore always be satisfied by default after the correct 
application of the other principles and purposes of sentencing.  The Court of Appeal in 
R v Kohey conveyed similar sentiments, stating that parity is best attained by 
“sentencing each offender appropriately for his role in the overall offending,”
79
 taking 
into account the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. Miller J merged an analysis 
of sentencing parity against McNaughton with his analysis of the overall assessment of 
Cunnard, citing the sentence imposed on the former as a factor for the imposition of a 
sentence less than life on the latter. In doing so, he is diverting his focus away from the 
“circumstances of the offence and the offender,” which is the explicit legislative 
direction given under s 102.   
 
On the other hand, there is nothing in the Sentencing Act that prevents Miller J from 
placing a disproportionate emphasis on s 8(e). While he must consider all of the 
principles from (a) to (j), as indicated by the use of the conjunctive “and” at the end of 
each subsection, he is perfectly entitled to give greater weight to a particular subsection 
of relevance. Furthermore, there is nothing in the express wording of s 8(e) which 
indicates that it should not be taken into account when analysing the circumstances of 
the offence and the offender. Its fulfilment only as a by-product of the successful 
application of all of the other principles is logical, and while there is limited common 
law precedent to back the theory up, it is not explicit in statute. On the face of the 
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Sentencing Act it is no different to the other principles of sentencing, and therefore 
while it must be taken into account, there is not guidance as to when, where and how it 
should be applied. This is left to the discretion of the judge; a discretion which is on the 
one hand crucial, but on the other gives rise to a number of wider concerns.    
 
V Wider Issues Surrounding Judicial Discretion and Section 102 
The hallmark of the new sentencing regime for murder is its limited flexibility.
80
 Under 
the Sentencing Act’s predecessor, the Criminal Justice Act 1985, the mandatory penalty 
for a conviction of murder was life imprisonment. The sentencing judge had no 
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Now a judge can make use of the narrow 
“manifestly unjust” provision under s 102 to show leniency in appropriate cases. While 
this has obvious benefits in that it allows an imposition of a sentence to be made 
befitting the nature of the crime, there are also inherent risks.  
 
A Benefits of Giving Judges Discretion when Sentencing for Murder 
Discretion is a crucial part of sentencing, as it gives a judge the ability to tailor a 
sentence appropriate to both the facts of the case and the circumstances of the 
offender.
81
  Indeed, “individualisation cannot be achieved without a discretion being 
exercised”.
82
 This is especially important in New Zealand because the Crimes Act does 
not break the offence of murder down into different categories to reflect different levels 
of culpability. The United States, for example, has categorised homicide into first and 
second degree murder.
83
 Such a categorisation recognises the fact that the offence of 
murder catches a broad range of situations, from prolonged torture killings right through 
to reckless killings and euthanasia. These situations have vastly different levels of 
culpability and require significantly different sentences to reflect that; but because they 
are caught by the same section under the Crimes Act the difference in sentence has to be 
arrived at through judicial discretion.
84
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Discretion in sentencing therefore allows the court to give effect to different shades of 
culpability. In relation to murder, this can be done when imposing the minimum period 
of non-parole or by rebutting the presumption of life imprisonment itself on the grounds 
that it would be manifestly unjust under s 102. In Cunnard, judicial discretion is of 
particular importance given Cunnard derived his liability from the criminal actions of a 
principal offender. As previously discussed, Cunnard’s level of culpability is 
considerably lower than McNaughton’s, despite “being ascribed, alongside 
[McNaughton], with legal responsibility for the offence”.
85
 Without sentencing 
discretion – that is, if the sentence and non-parole periods applied to all people 
convicted under ss 167 and 168 were fixed – this variation in culpability could not be 
acknowledged. 
 
A removal of judicial discretion would also have wider implications on the operation of 
the Sentencing Act. The purposes and principles of sentencing, for example, would 
become obsolete, as they are inextricably bound together with a discretionary analysis 
of the individual circumstances of the offence and the offender. The reason for this is 
clear: it is impossible for the legislature to tailor sentences for every possible fact 
variation that the Act will apply to.  
 
B Issues with Miller J’s Use of Discretion 
Judicial discretion, by its very nature, promulgates inconsistency and uncertainty at 
sentencing.
86
 This poses a number of problems. It makes it “more difficult for men to 
plan and conduct their affairs,”
87
 which is contrary to the rule of law, and it means that a 
defendant may receive a different sentence depending on which judge he appears 
before. While the application of s 8(e) of the Sentencing Act requires consistency in 
sentencing, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that judges are only human, and will 
analyse a case consistent with their personal beliefs and life experience. Viscount 
Dilhorne warned that investing magistrates with discretion was “fraught with 
considerable dangers,”
88
 and Professor Geoff Hall has said that:
89
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Sentencing is not a rational mechanical process; it is a human process and is subject to all the 
frailties of the human mind. A wide variety of factors, including the Judge’s background, 
experience, social values, moral outlook, penal philosophy and views as to the merits and demerits 
of a particular penalty influence the sentencing decision. 
 
Miller J imposed a sentence of 10 years on Cunnard after rebutting the presumption of 
life imprisonment. Setting aside for one moment the issue as to whether or not the 
presumption should have been displaced in the first place, a sentence of 10 years is on 
par with the maximum sentence available for a number offences that are significantly 
less serious than murder, a crime which has been described by the courts as “the most 
serious offence in our criminal calendar”.
9091
 Miller J explicitly says at para [70] that in 
a case such as this, if Cunnard had only been convicted of manslaughter, “a starting 
point may fall within the range of seven to 12 years”. Therefore the sentence of ten 
years imposed by Miller J is similar,
92
 by his own admission, to a sentence he would 
impose for manslaughter, and in doing so he fails to give weight to the sentence of 
murder passed down on Cunnard by a jury of his peers. It could be construed as the 
judge disagreeing with the conviction given, and in effect replacing it at the sentencing 
stage. 
 
This is further highlighted by Miller J at para [57] of his sentencing notes, where he 
remarks that Cunnard “accept[s] responsibility, while understandably believing that [he] 
ought to have been convicted of manslaughter”.
93
 This plainly indicates that Miller J 
empathised with Cunnard’s resentment towards his conviction, and in turn begs the 
question: was this empathy a factor in the use of judicial discretion to rebut the 
presumption of life imprisonment under s 102? If it is, then this is plainly an irrelevant 
consideration that falls outside the purview of the Sentencing Act. Furthermore, it is a 
use of discretion which undermines the role of the jury in our criminal justice system, 
and fails to recognise that “juries rule on legal guilt, guilt determined by the highest 
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standard of proof we know, beyond a reasonable doubt”.
94
 It was open to the jury to 
convict Cunnard of manslaughter, even though his liability was derived from a principal 
offender who committed murder,
95
 and in rare circumstances the jury can even make a 
recommendation when giving their verdict to show leniency.
96
 They consciously opted 
not to. The limited degree of discretion given to judges when sentencing under s 102 
was surely not intended to erode the decision of the jury. The discretion exists to be 
exercised when the sentence, not the conviction, would otherwise be manifestly unjust.  
 
On the other hand, the repercussions that derive from a conviction of murder are wider 
than simply the number of years one spends imprisoned. The stigma associated with the 
conviction of murder is a significant punishment in and of itself, something Cunnard 
will now have to bear for the rest of his life.
97
 So while the rebuttal of the presumption 
of life imprisonment under s 102 leaves Cunnard with a sentence of 10 years, a sentence 
which, from a purely numeric standpoint, is indeed on par with offences far less 
repugnant than murder, the label of murderer and associated stigma subsequently 
attached to Cunnard forms part of the punishment. Miller J could have been taking this 
into account when choosing to rebut the presumption. This argument, however, is 
undermined by the fact that stigma is a societal reaction to the seriousness of murder, 
and it should not mitigate the term of imprisonment. It is an extra-legal, and indeed 
abstract, concept, which comes inherently with the conviction. It is therefore not 
appropriate for the judiciary to take it into account when determining the length of a 
sentence.  
 
VI Implications of R v Cunnard 
From the preceding analysis, it is possible to draw two conclusions: (1) despite issues 
around discretionary emphasis and empathy, Miller J rebutted the presumption of life 
imprisonment in a manner consistent with previous case law, and (2) the manifestly 
unjust provision under s 102 has not been expanded. The “exceptional circumstances” 
test put forward by the Court of Appeal in R v Rapira continues to apply, ensuring that 
the threshold to rebut the presumption remains highly restrictive.  
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The case could however be seen more generally as an example of how the ‘manifestly 
unjust’ provision is being interpreted more liberally than was anticipated by the 
legislature. It has set a precedent that people who are peripheral secondary parties to an 
offence can successfully rely on the manifest injustice provision in the same way that a 
principal offender can. While this is not a revelation in the law, as there was nothing 
specifically preventing this from occurring before Cunnard, it is another example of a 
case which differs from the situations put forward by the Law and Order Select 
Committee: cases of mercy killings, failed suicide pacts, and situations where there is a 
‘battered defendant’. 
 
On the other hand, that list was never intended to be exhaustive; if it was then those 
explicitly noted situations would have themselves been codified. The purpose of the 
section was to create a more flexible sentencing regime, not one built on arbitrary 
categories, so that the decision a judge comes to will be “appropriate in all the 
circumstances”.
98
  When conceptualised in this way, the decision in R v Cunnard in fact 
exemplifies the 2002 sentencing reforms in relation to murder. It is a perfect example of 
how the law has been applied flexibly to ensure a sentence is reached which fits “the 
nature of the crime and the offender,”
99
 a situation which could not have been reached 
under previous sentencing legislation. 
 
Since R v Cunnard, and up until the time of writing, there have been two further cases 
which have rebutted the presumption of life imprisonment under s 102: R v Rihia and R 
v Nelson. The former does not mention Cunnard at all, and the latter only mentions it in 
a footnote as authority for the fact that the s 102 presumption can be rebutted in cases 
where there is “limited involvement in the offending that gives rise to the crime”.
100
 
Defence counsel for the appellant in Te Wini v R attempted to use Cunnard as authority 
to claim that the courts have been taking an expansive approach to s 102, but this was 
immediately dismissed by Wild J, who stated that “the jurisprudence is now fairly 
settled, and the approach to any departure from the s 102 presumption constrained”.
101
 
This, however, is poor wording on the part of the judge. It is contradictory for the 
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section to be both flexible and constrained. Justice Wild must have meant that departure 
from the presumption is constrained only in the sense that the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ threshold enunciated by the Court or Appeal cannot be lowered. This 
interpretation is consistent with both the intent of the legislature and previous case 
authority.  
 
Despite judicial commentary suggesting that the jurisprudence surrounding s 102 is 
settled, it is still entirely open for a superior court to lower the manifestly unjust 
threshold. This would be an unlikely step, as it was the current Chief Justice, Dame Sian 
Elias, who delivered the judgment in R v Rapira which set the threshold so restrictively 
high in the first place. Even if the judiciary did act to expand s 102 in this way, it would 
likely provoke a swift response from the legislature, who always sought to “retain a 
strong presumption in favour of life imprisonment”.
102
 This would be consistent with 
politicians’ perennial desire to appear ‘tough on crime’.
103
 Parliamentary sovereignty 
allows any common law extension to be overruled through further legislation which 
would make the wording of s 102 more explicit.  
 
The Crown has appealed the sentence imposed on Cunnard by Miller J, and a full bench 
of the Court of Appeal will hear submissions later this year. It is possible that the 
appellate judges will find fault with the disproportionate emphasis Miller J placed on 
the need for parity, but it is unlikely this will be enough to quash the sentence.  A judge 
has an inherent degree of discretion when imposing a sentence, and an appellate court 
must be careful when reviewing a sentence not to substitute its own view of what the 
sentence should have been, because it fails to give due regard to that discretion.
104
 It is 
possible that the Court of Appeal will give further guidance on what constitutes 
manifest injustice for future cases to follow, but this again is unlikely given the number 
of cross-appeals from the Crown and other co-offenders that need to be dealt with. The 
Court is more likely to uphold Miller J’s decision, and make comments similar to those 
of Wild J’s about the jurisprudence relating to s 102 being settled.  
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Settled, that is, only until the next case comes before the courts which attempts to 
capitalise on judicial discretion and push the boundaries of what constitutes manifest 
injustice. How long it will remain the domain of truly ‘exceptional cases’ is a mystery, 
but what is clear is that R v Cunnard has done nothing to erode the restrictive nature of s 
102.   
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VII Appendix  
 
Crimes Act 1961 
66  Parties to offences 
(2)  Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful 
purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence 
committed by any one of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the 
commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the 
prosecution of the common purpose. 
 
 
172  Punishment of murder 
(1)  Every one who commits murder is liable to imprisonment for life. 
(2)  Subsection (1) is subject to section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002. 
 
 
Sentencing Act 2002 
7  Purposes of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
(1)  The purposes for which a court may sentence or otherwise deal with an offender 
are — 
(a)  to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the 
community by the offending; or 
(b)  to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and an 
acknowledgment of, that harm; or 
(c)  to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or 
(d)  to provide reparation for harm done by the offending; or 
(e)  to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or 
(f)  to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a 
similar offence; or 
(g)  to protect the community from the offender; or 
(h)  to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and reintegration; or 
(i)  a combination of 2 or more of the purposes in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
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(2)  To avoid doubt, nothing about the order in which the purposes appear in this 
section implies that any purpose referred to must be given greater weight than any 
other purpose referred to. 
 
8 Principles of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court— 
(a)  must take into account the gravity of the offending in the particular case, including 
the degree of culpability of the offender; and 
(b)  must take into account the seriousness of the type of offence in comparison with 
other types of offences, as indicated by the maximum penalties prescribed for the 
offences; and 
(c)  must impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence if the offending is 
within the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, unless 
circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate; and 
(d)  must impose a penalty near to the maximum prescribed for the offence if the 
offending is near to the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, 
unless circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate; and 
(e)  must take into account the general desirability of consistency with appropriate 
sentencing levels and other means of dealing with offenders in respect of similar 
offenders committing similar offences in similar circumstances; and 
(f)  must take into account any information provided to the court concerning the effect 
of the offending on the victim; and 
(g)  must impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances, 
in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in section 10A; and 
(h)  must take into account any particular circumstances of the offender that mean that a 
sentence or other means of dealing with the offender that would otherwise be 
appropriate would, in the particular instance, be disproportionately severe; and 
(i)  must take into account the offender's personal, family, whanau, community, and 
cultural background in imposing a sentence or other means of dealing with the 
offender with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose; and 
27 
 
(j)  must take into account any outcomes of restorative justice processes that have 
occurred, or that the court is satisfied are likely to occur, in relation to the particular 
case (including, without limitation, anything referred to in section 10). 
 
10A Hierarchy of sentences and orders 
(1)  The hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in subsection (2) reflects the relative 
level of supervision and monitoring of, and restrictions imposed on, an offender 
under each sentence or order. 
(2)  The hierarchy of sentences and orders, from the least restrictive to the most 
restrictive, is as follows: 
(a)  discharge or order to come up for sentence if called on: 
(b)  sentences of a fine and reparation:  
(c)  community-based sentences of community work and supervision: 
(d)  community-based sentences of intensive supervision and community 
detention: 
(e)  sentence of home detention: 
(f)  sentence of imprisonment. 
 
16  Sentence of imprisonment 
(1)  When considering the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for any particular 
offence, the court must have regard to the desirability of keeping offenders in the 
community as far as that is practicable and consonant with the safety of the 
community. 
(2)  The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that,— 
(a)  a sentence is being imposed for all or any of the purposes in section 7(1)(a) 
to (c), (e), (f), or (g); and 
(b)  those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other than imprisonment; 
and 
(c)  no other sentence would be consistent with the application of the principles 
in section 8 to the particular case. 
(3)  This section is subject to any provision in this or any other enactment that— 
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(a)  provides a presumption in favour of or against imposing a sentence of 
imprisonment in relation to a particular offence; or 
(b)  requires a court to impose a sentence of imprisonment in relation to a 
particular offence. 
 
31  General requirement to give reasons 
(1)  A court must give reasons in open court— 
(a)  for the imposition of a sentence or for any other means of dealing with the 
offender; and 
(b)  for the making of an order under Part 2. 
(2) The reasons may be given under this section with whatever level of particularity is 
appropriate to the particular case. 
(3)  Nothing in this section limits any other provision of this or any other enactment that 
requires a court to give reasons. 
(4)  The fact that a court, in giving reasons in a particular case, does not mention a 
particular principle in section 8 or a particular factor in section 9 or a consideration 
under section 10 or section 11 is not in itself grounds for an appeal against a 
sentence imposed or an order made in that case. 
 
86  Imposition of minimum period of imprisonment in relation to determinate 
sentence of imprisonment 
(1)  If a court sentences an offender to a determinate sentence of imprisonment of more 
than 2 years for a particular offence, it may, at the same time as it sentences the 
offender, order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment in 
relation to that particular sentence. 
(2)  The court may impose a minimum period of imprisonment that is longer than the 
period otherwise applicable under section 84(1) of the Parole Act 2002 if it is 
satisfied that that period is insufficient for all or any of the following purposes: 
(a)  holding the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and the 
community by the offending: 
(b)  denouncing the conduct in which the offender was involved: 
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(c)  deterring the offender or other persons from committing the same or a 
similar offence: 
(d)  protecting the community from the offender. 
(3)  [Repealed] 
(4)  A minimum period of imprisonment imposed under this section must not exceed 
the lesser of— 
(a)  two-thirds of the full term of the sentence; or 
(b)  10 years.  
    (5)  For the purposes of Part 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, an order under this 
section is a sentence. 
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